Highland Willow

Journal · Economics

What is a DAO? Types, pros and cons vs a traditional company

A decentralized autonomous organization replaces the org chart with a vote and a treasury that only code can open. Here are six ways that is built, drawn beside an ordinary company, with the evidence on what it does well and where it breaks.

Highland Willow · Boone, North Carolina · 5 November 2026

A DAO, or decentralized autonomous organization, is an organization whose rules and money live in software on a blockchain, and whose members change those rules by voting. There is no chief executive who can sign a cheque. A proposal is posted, the members vote, and if it passes, code moves the funds. Vitalik Buterin sketched the idea on the Ethereum blog in May 2014: an entity that holds its own capital, where decisions come from the protocol rather than from a person. Hassan and De Filippi's 2021 entry in the Internet Policy Review is the most careful short definition in the academic literature.

That sounds like a technology story. It is really an economics story, and an old one. In 1937 Ronald Coase asked why firms exist at all, if markets are so good at allocating work. His answer was that using the market has costs: finding people, agreeing prices, writing and enforcing contracts. A firm replaces many small contracts with one hierarchy, and it grows until running the hierarchy costs more than using the market. Every DAO is a bet that code can lower some of those costs enough to do without most of the hierarchy.

This post draws a traditional company and six DAO structures on the same grid, so you can see exactly what changes. Then it weighs the pros and cons against the evidence, including the research on ROWE, the Results-Only Work Environment, which tested the nearest thing ordinary companies have tried to “judge the work, not the hours”.

Two problems every organization has to solve

Strip any organization down and it has two jobs. Someone has to decide what to spend money on, and someone has to check the work that money paid for.

In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling gave the first problem its standard name in economics: the agency cost. Owners hire managers to act for them, managers have interests of their own, and the owners pay to monitor them, bond them and live with what slips through. A board, an audit, a bonus plan and an org chart are all ways of paying that cost.

A traditional company answers both problems with a hierarchy. Shareholders elect a board, the board appoints a chief executive, and authority flows down a tree of managers. Each manager both assigns work and judges it. A DAO answers them differently. The decision becomes a public vote, and the payout becomes code that runs when the vote passes. Whether that lowers agency costs or just moves them is the whole question, and the evidence below says: some of each.

A traditional company vs six types of DAO, drawn

Each diagram uses the same building blocks: grey boxes are steps, the gold box is where the money sits, plum dots are people with votes, and green dots are people doing paid work. Pick a structure to compare it with the traditional company. Without JavaScript all seven are shown in order.

Traditional company

A traditional companyShareholders elect a board, the board appoints a CEO, the CEO directs managers, and managers direct staff. The whole tree sits inside one legal entity.LEGAL ENTITY: CORPORATION OR LLCShareholdersBoardCEOManagerManagerManagerEach manager assigns the work and judges it.Owners and workers are mostly different people.

How it works. Ownership and control are separated by design. The people who own the company mostly do not work in it, and the people who work in it are directed and judged by managers. The whole tree sits inside one legal entity, which can sign contracts, be sued, and limit what owners can lose to what they put in.

What it is good at. Fast, accountable decisions, and someone you can sue. What it costs. Jensen and Meckling's agency costs: managers, monitoring, and the gap between what owners want and what managers do.

Token voting

A token-voting DAOMany token holders of very unequal size vote directly on a proposal. If it passes, code moves money from an on-chain treasury to the contributors who do the work.TOKEN HOLDERS: ONE TOKEN, ONE VOTElarge holderProposal and on-chain voteCode executes if it passesTreasuryContributors paid per proposal, bounty or stream

How it works. Anyone who holds the governance token can vote, weighted by how many tokens they hold. Proposals that pass are executed on chain. Uniswap and Compound are the textbook cases, and Ethereum.org lists MakerDAO as its example of a token-based DAO.

The catch is in the dot sizes. Fritsch, Müller and Wattenhofer counted how few voters it takes to hold a majority of voting power: 8 in Compound and 11 in Uniswap. On average under 10% of all tokens took part in a vote. Buterin himself argued in 2021 that coin voting lets large holders dominate even when nobody is attacking it, because small holders have little reason to vote. The dots are drawn unequal to show the shape, not to scale any real DAO.

Delegated

A delegated DAOToken holders lend their voting power to a few delegates, who vote on their behalf and can be replaced at any time. Some holders never vote or delegate at all.HOLDERS LEND THEIR VOTES TO DELEGATESDDDDDelegates vote; code runsTreasuryA holder can take the vote back at any time.hollow: tokens nobody votes with

How it works. Most holders will not read every proposal, so they lend their votes to a delegate, who votes for them and can be dropped at any time. It is the DAO version of a representative democracy, or of a proxy vote at a shareholder meeting.

What the data say. Hall and Miyazaki studied more than 250,000 voters across 18 Ethereum DAOs and found that on average 17% of voting tokens were delegated, and that participation stays relatively low. It can work: in ENS, where claiming the airdrop required choosing a delegate, community delegates hold about 60% of voting rights and it takes 18 delegates to make a majority. The hollow dots stand for tokens that never vote at all.

Multisig council

A multisig or council DAOHolders vote in an off-chain poll that no code enforces. A council of nine signers, five of whom must approve, actually moves money from the treasury.THE VOTE SIGNALS. SIGNERS EXECUTE.Off-chain poll (no code)5 of 9 signers must approveTreasuryThe code checks signatures, not the poll.Signers are named, trusted people.

How it works. Holders vote in an off-chain poll, which is cheap because it costs no transaction fees. But the poll moves no money. The treasury sits in a multi-signature wallet, and a set number of named signers must approve every payment. The figure shows five of nine; the numbers vary.

The trade. It is cheaper and safer against a flash attack than full on-chain voting, because a stranger cannot borrow tokens and pass a proposal in one transaction. It is also much closer to a board of directors than the name suggests. The code checks signatures, not the poll, so the poll binds only as far as the signers keep their word.

Member shares

A member-share DAOEight members around a shared treasury hold shares that cannot be sold. New members are voted in. Any member who disagrees can ragequit, leaving with a proportional share of the treasury.SHARES CANNOT BE SOLD. THEY ARE VOTED IN.Treasuryragequitleaves with a shareof the treasuryapplicant: proposal plus tribute

How it works. Ethereum.org calls this the share-based model. Shares cannot be bought on an exchange. A newcomer applies with a proposal and a tribute of money or work, and the existing members vote them in. Its signature feature is the exit: a member who disagrees with a decision can ragequit, leaving with their proportional share of the treasury before the decision takes effect.

Who uses it. Ethereum.org lists charities, worker collectives and investment clubs. A close cousin is the reputation-based DAO, where voting weight is earned by contributing and cannot be bought, sold or delegated; DXdao has run that way since 2019. These look more like a partnership or a co-operative than a public company, and the guaranteed exit is something an ordinary minority shareholder rarely gets.

Bicameral

A bicameral DAOA Token House, where votes are weighted by tokens held, decides protocol upgrades and incentives. A Citizens' House, where each citizen has one vote, decides retroactive funding for public goods.TOKEN HOUSECITIZENS' HOUSEweight = tokens heldone person, one voteUpgrades, incentivesRetro fundingTwo kinds of member, two kinds of decision:capital in one house, people in the other.

How it works. The Optimism Collective, introduced in April 2022, split its governance into two houses. The Token House votes by tokens held, on protocol upgrades and project incentives. The Citizens' House gives each citizen one vote, and runs retroactive funding for public goods: paying, after the fact, for work that turned out to be useful.

Why it matters. It is a direct answer to the concentration problem in the token-voting tab. Capital speaks in one house and people speak in the other, and Optimism's own forum calls it an initial experiment in checks and balances. It is also the clearest example of results-only pay anywhere in this post: money follows impact, measured afterwards.

Legal wrapper

A DAO with and without a legal wrapperOn the left, members with no legal entity around them, which courts have treated as a general partnership. On the right, the same members inside a DAO LLC or nonprofit association that limits their liability.NO LEGAL WRAPPERWRAPPEDA court may treat it as ageneral partnership.Members can be personallyliable for its debts.DAO LLC or nonprofitassociation (DUNA).Liability is limited.It can sign a contract.

Why this tab exists. Without a legal entity around it, a DAO may simply be a general partnership in the eyes of a court, and partners are personally liable for the partnership's debts. That is not a hypothetical. In Sarcuni v. bZx DAO (2023) and Samuels v. Lido DAO (2024), federal judges in California let claims proceed on exactly that theory, and in the Lido case they reached venture investors who took part in governance.

The wrappers. Wyoming created the DAO LLC in 2021 and the Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association, or DUNA, in 2024. A DUNA needs at least 100 members and shields them from liability for its contracts merely for being members. Uniswap's governance adopted a Wyoming DUNA in September 2025. Details are in the legal section below.

Types of DAO by purpose

The tabs above sort DAOs by how they decide. The more common way to list the types of DAO is by what they are for. The categories and examples below follow Alchemy's 2022 typology, with Ethereum.org's for the CityDAO example.

TypeWhat it doesExample
Protocol DAOGoverns a piece of software that many others use, such as an exchange or lending marketUniswap, MakerDAO
Grants DAOPools money and votes on which projects to fundAave Grants DAO, Gitcoin
Investment DAOMembers pool capital and vote on investments, like a clubMetaCartel Ventures
Collector DAOBuys and holds an asset togetherConstitutionDAO, FlamingoDAO
Social DAOA membership community with a shared treasuryFriends With Benefits
Media DAOReaders and writers jointly run a publicationBanklessDAO
Philanthropy DAORaises and distributes donationsUkraineDAO
Land or propertyHolds a real-world asset through a legal wrapperCityDAO, 40 acres in Wyoming

The purposes and the structures mix freely. A protocol DAO is usually token-voting with delegation; an investment club is usually member shares; a grants DAO may use any of them.

What ROWE taught us about results-only work

A DAO contributor usually has no manager, no hours and no office. They are paid when a proposal passes, a bounty is claimed or a funding round says their work mattered. That is the most extreme version of an idea ordinary companies have already tested: judge people only on results.

ROWE, the Results-Only Work Environment, was built inside Best Buy's headquarters by two HR employees, Cali Ressler and Jody Thompson. It was piloted from 2003 and spread through the corporate office over the next few years. Under ROWE, employees could work whenever and wherever they liked, provided the results were delivered. Ressler and Thompson wrote it up in Why Work Sucks and How to Fix It (Portfolio, 2008). Unusually for a management fashion, sociologists studied it while it ran.

StudyDesignWhat it found
Kelly, Moen and Tranby, American Sociological Review, 2011608 Best Buy head-office staff, surveyed before and six months after; not randomisedLess work-family conflict and better schedule fit, entirely through more control over when and where people worked
Moen, Kelly and Hill, Social Problems, 2011775 employees, turnover records for eight months6.1% left under ROWE against 11.1% in comparison teams; lower odds of leaving regardless of gender, age or family stage
Moen, Kelly, Tranby and Huang, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 2011659 employees, six months apartAlmost an extra hour of sleep on work nights counting indirect effects (about 28 minutes directly); fewer people working while sick
Kelly, Moen, Oakes and others, American Sociological Review, 2014Randomised trial, 56 groups, 694 IT employees; the STAR programme, partly modelled on ROWE plus supervisor trainingStatistically significant but modest falls in work-family conflict; no rise in hours or job demands

Two randomised experiments by Nicholas Bloom and colleagues are close relatives. At Ctrip, a Chinese travel company, working from home raised call-centre performance by 13% and halved attrition, though promotion rates for the same performance fell. A 2024 trial of 1,612 staff at another Chinese firm, published in Nature, found two days a week at home cut quits by a third with no damage to performance grades. Both studies test where people work rather than results-only management, so they are evidence about autonomy, not proof of ROWE.

The limits, stated by the researchers themselves

The Best Buy studies were not randomised: divisions joined when their vice presidents chose to. They covered head-office staff only, never store workers, and ran six to eight months. The authors warn that long-term costs such as slower promotion could offset the gains. The famous “35% more productive” figure came from Best Buy and from the consultancy that sells ROWE, not from the research. And in 2013 Best Buy's new leadership ended ROWE, saying it made sense to consider “how the work gets done” and not just the results.

Here is the lesson for DAOs. ROWE did not remove judgement; it moved it. Someone still had to say what a result was, and at Best Buy that was still a manager. A DAO has to answer the same question with no manager, and it answers it with a vote, a bounty spec or a funding round. That is why DAOs keep reinventing management. Gitcoin's DAO found in 2023 that about 95% of its spending was contributor pay, and benchmarked that pay to the median of a commercial salary survey. Tools such as Coordinape, where contributors allocate rewards to each other, and SourceCred, which scores contributions from a graph of activity, are attempts to measure results without a boss. Nobody has yet published the kind of controlled study of them that ROWE got.

The pros: what a DAO does better than a traditional company

  1. Anyone can join, from anywhere. Membership is a token or a vote, not an employment contract in one country. ConstitutionDAO raised about $47 million from 17,437 donors in November 2021, with a median gift of $206.26.
  2. The books are public. A DAO's treasury and every payment out of it are on a public ledger. A shareholder in an ordinary company sees a quarterly summary; a DAO member can watch each transaction.
  3. Some agency costs fall. Davidson's 2025 paper in the Journal of Institutional Economics applies Jensen and Meckling, Demsetz and Williamson to DAOs and concludes that DAOs can reduce some transaction and information costs, but only if smart contracts and internal markets keep agency costs down.
  4. Exit is guaranteed where the design allows it. In a share-based DAO a dissenting member can ragequit with their slice of the treasury. That is a stronger minority protection than most private-company shareholders have.
  5. It can fund things markets underfund. Gitcoin, built on the quadratic funding design of Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (Management Science, 2019), says it has distributed more than $60 million to open-source and public-goods projects.
  6. Autonomy by default. Contributors choose their hours and their work, which the ROWE research links to lower turnover and better sleep, with the caveats above.

The cons: where DAOs break

  1. Power concentrates anyway. Feichtinger and colleagues studied 21 DAOs and found that in 17 of them a voting majority was held by fewer than ten participants. Chainalysis looked at ten major DAOs in 2022 and found that under 1% of holders held 90% of voting power. A 2026 model in Management Science by Han, Lee and Li finds that concentrated ownership slows a platform's growth. Decentralized in name is often a handful of whales in practice.
  2. Few people vote. Fritsch and colleagues calculated that, on average, 7.5% of circulating tokens would have been enough to win a past vote. They compare that with about 70% turnout at US shareholder meetings.
  3. Votes can be bought or borrowed. In April 2022 an attacker took a flash loan, borrowed enough voting power to pass a malicious proposal in Beanstalk, and drained $182 million of the protocol's assets, keeping at least $80 million. In May 2023 a disguised proposal handed an attacker 1.2 million votes in Tornado Cash's governance. In July 2024 a group passed a proposal moving 499,000 COMP, about $24 million and 5% of Compound's treasury, into its own vault, by 682,191 votes to 633,636, before agreeing to rescind it.
  4. Code is the contract, bugs included. The original DAO raised about 12 million ETH in 2016. In June that year an attacker exploited its code and moved about 3.6 million ETH, a third of the total. Ethereum recovered the funds only by changing the blockchain's own history in a hard fork.
  5. Members can be personally liable. In 2023 a federal court ordered Ooki DAO to pay a $643,542 penalty and held that a DAO is a “person” under commodities law. The CFTC had defined the DAO as the token holders who voted. With the bZx and Lido rulings in the legal-wrapper tab above, the message is that voting can make you a partner.
  6. Securities law applies. In 2017 the SEC concluded that the original DAO's tokens were securities, while choosing not to bring an enforcement action.
  7. Coordination costs real money. ConstitutionDAO lost its auction to a $43.2 million bid, and its donors spent about $1 million in transaction fees giving and getting refunds. Feichtinger's team estimates that Uniswap's token-transfer overhead for governance cost just under $3 million.
  8. Someone still has to decide what a result is. The ROWE section explains why this does not go away. In a DAO it is decided by vote, which is slow, public and open to the concentration problems above.
A note on how big DAOs are

This post gives no total for the number of DAOs or the money they hold. The usual source, DeepDAO, stopped updating in November 2025, and its site now asks readers not to use its figures for research. Older totals from it are easy to find, but there is no current one.

DAO vs traditional company, side by side

Traditional companyDAO
Who decidesBoard and managersToken or member vote, sometimes via delegates or signers
Who checks the workA managerA vote, a bounty spec, peers, or a funding round after the fact
How money movesOfficers signCode executes a passed proposal, or signers approve
Who can joinHired or invested by agreementAnyone who acquires a token, or is voted in
TransparencyPeriodic reportsEvery transaction public
ExitSell shares if a buyer existsSell tokens, or ragequit in share-based designs
LiabilityLimited by the entityPossibly unlimited without a wrapper
Main failureManagers serve themselvesWhales, apathy, and code bugs
SpeedAs fast as a signatureAs fast as a voting period

Are DAOs legal? The wrappers, state by state

A DAO is legal to run. The open question is what it is in law, and the answer depends on whether it has a wrapper.

WhereLawYear
VermontBlockchain-based LLCEffective 1 July 2018
WyomingDAO LLC supplementEffective 1 July 2021
TennesseeLLCs that declare themselves decentralized organizationsSigned 25 April 2022
Marshall IslandsDAO LLC, for-profit or non-profit2022
UtahDecentralized Autonomous Organizations ActSigned 2023, effective 1 January 2024
WyomingDUNA, a nonprofit association of at least 100 membersEffective 1 July 2024
AlabamaDUNA lawSigned April 2026, expected in full effect 1 October 2026

Several real DAOs have now chosen a wrapper. Uniswap's governance adopted a Wyoming DUNA in September 2025, and Andreessen Horowitz, an investor that advocates for the structure, names Nouns DAO among the other adopters. In Congress, according to Andreessen Horowitz, drafts of the CLARITY Act recognize the DUNA; as of August 2026 the bill had cleared the Senate Banking Committee and was waiting for a floor vote. We have not confirmed what happened after that.

This is a summary of what the statutes and rulings say, not legal advice. Anyone forming a DAO should speak to a lawyer in the state concerned.

Should a business become a DAO?

For most businesses, no. A company with payroll, customers, inventory and suppliers needs to sign contracts quickly, take responsibility when something goes wrong, and keep customer records private. A public vote and a public ledger are poor at all three. The places DAOs fit are narrower: software that many parties rely on and nobody should own, pooled funds for grants or investment clubs, and communities that want a shared treasury.

The parts worth borrowing do not need a blockchain:

  • Publish the budget. A DAO's open treasury is an extreme version of open-book management, and the moderate version is available to any firm.
  • Write down what a result is. ROWE and DAOs both show that results-only work succeeds or fails on that definition, not on the freedom around it.
  • Give dissenters an exit. A clear, fair way out is a check on the majority.
  • Let people delegate. Not everyone needs to decide everything. They need to know who is deciding for them, and be able to change it.

What this post does not show

We did not measure any DAO ourselves. Every figure is read from the sources listed, on 5 November 2026, and some of it is already historical: the governance-concentration studies use data from 2022 and 2023, and DAOs change their rules often. The ROWE studies are of one company's head office. Where a source could not be checked, or where sources disagreed, we left the figure out rather than pick one.

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Questions people ask

What is a DAO in simple terms?

A DAO, or decentralized autonomous organization, is a group whose rules and shared money are held in software on a blockchain. Members vote on proposals, and when a proposal passes, the software carries it out, for example by paying someone. There is no chief executive who can spend the money alone.

What are the types of DAO?

By purpose: protocol DAOs that govern software, grants DAOs, investment DAOs, collector DAOs, social DAOs, media DAOs and philanthropy DAOs. By structure: token voting, delegated voting, multisig councils, member-share or reputation DAOs, and bicameral designs such as Optimism's Token House and Citizens' House.

What are the pros and cons of a DAO?

Pros: anyone can join from anywhere, the treasury is public, some agency costs fall, members can sometimes exit with their share, and it can fund public goods. Cons: voting power concentrates in a few holders, few people vote, votes can be bought or borrowed, code bugs can lose the treasury, and members without a legal wrapper can be personally liable.

How is a DAO different from a traditional company?

A traditional company decides through a board and managers and moves money when officers sign. A DAO decides by member vote and moves money when code executes a passed proposal. A company limits its owners' liability by law; a DAO does so only if it is wrapped in an entity such as a DAO LLC or a DUNA.

What is ROWE, the results-only work environment?

ROWE is a management approach created at Best Buy's headquarters by Cali Ressler and Jody Thompson, in which employees choose when and where to work as long as results are delivered. Studies of it found less work-family conflict, lower turnover and more sleep. They were not randomised and covered office staff only, and Best Buy ended ROWE in 2013.

Is a DAO a legal entity?

Not on its own. Courts in the bZx and Lido cases allowed claims that a DAO without a wrapper is a general partnership, whose members can be personally liable. Wyoming, Utah, Tennessee, Vermont, Alabama and the Marshall Islands offer legal forms for DAOs, including Wyoming's DAO LLC and DUNA.

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  45. Jennings M, Slavin A. Why the DUNA matters. a16z, 2 April 2026. https://a16zfrontier.com/posts/article/why-the-duna-matters-decentralized-organizations
  46. Decrypt. Senate keeps CLARITY Act alive, 8 August 2026. https://decrypt.co/375174/senate-keeps-clarity-act-alive-with-crypto-bill-vote-set-for-september
  47. CoinDesk. Attacker drains $182M from Beanstalk stablecoin protocol, 17 April 2022. https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/04/17/attacker-drains-182m-from-beanstalk-stablecoin-protocol
  48. The Block. Tornado Cash governance attack, 21 May 2023. https://www.theblock.co/post/231637
  49. The Block. Compound Proposal 289, 28 July 2024. https://www.theblock.co/post/307943
  50. Cointelegraph. Golden Boys agree to rescind Compound proposal, 30 July 2024. https://cointelegraph.com/news/golden-boys-behind-compound-governance-attack-agree-to-rescind-proposal
  51. The Block. ConstitutionDAO loses Sotheby's auction, 18 November 2021. https://www.theblock.co/post/124872
  52. AFP via TechXplore. Crypto donors lose about $1 million in fees, 24 November 2021. https://techxplore.com/news/2021-11-crypto-donors-mn-fees-constitution.html
  53. DeepDAO. Organizations (no longer updated since November 2025). https://deepdao.io/organizations

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